






















COST ALLOCATION IN A BANK 
ATM NETWORK 
 
























ISSN 0924-7815 Cost Allocation in a Bank ATM Network ∗
Endre Bjørndal † Herbert Hamers ‡ Maurice Koster §
Abstract
We consider a situation in which a group of banks consider connecting
their Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) in a network, so that the banks’
customers may use ATMs of any bank in the network. The problem
studied is that of allocating the total transaction costs arising in the
network, among the participating banks. The situation is modeled as
a cooperative game with transferable utility. We propose two allocation
rules, and discuss their relation to the core and other well-known solution
concepts, as well as to population monotonicity.
1 Introduction
Through Automated Teller Machines (ATMs), ﬁnancial organizations (here-
after called banks) provide service, e.g. cash withdrawals, to their customers.
For various reasons, networks of ATMs have formed, consisting of several
banks, where customers of one bank may use ATMs of any bank in the net-
work. In such a system, there is a diﬀerence between the costs that are incurred
by a bank, and the costs that are actually caused by that bank’s customers.
The banks will seek a method to compensate for such imbalances in network
usage, and according to Gow and Thomas (1998), with reference to the UK,
this is done by setting interchange fees. Every time a customer of bank i
uses an ATM of bank j,b a n ki has to pay a fee fij to bank j. Setting inter-
change fees is equivalent to allocating the total cost arising in such a network,
and the fee structure will be the result of a negotiation process involving the
participating banks.
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1The (transaction) costs arising in such a network depends on how transactions
are processed. If the ATMs of the network are not easily accessible for the
customers of the member banks, the customers will tend to use alternative
means of processing their transactions, e.g. withdrawing cash over the counter.
Also, the cost of processing a transaction will be higher if the processing
involves linking computer systems of diﬀerent institutions, than if no such links
are necessary. The availability, for a particular customer, of ATMs belonging
to the network to which his bank is aﬃliated, and in particular, of ATMs
belonging to his own bank, depends on the physical location of the customer
as well as of the various ATMs in the network, since the customer need to be
physically present at the site of an ATM in order to be able to use it.
Cooperative game theory has proven to be successful to analyse allocation
problems that are related to situation from practice. We mention Littlechild
(1977), Nouweland et. al. (1996), Fragnelli et al. (2000) and S´ anchez-Soriano
et al. (2002). Hence, also our ATM cost allocation problem will be modeled
as a cooperative game with transferable utility, and in doing so, we explicitly
model the location of customers (transactions) and ATMs. A key question
is whether there exist cost allocations that insure against break-up of the
network. Given such an allocation, it should not be possible for any groups
of banks to lower their costs by leaving the network. This requirement is
related to the core of the corresponding game. Since ﬁnding a core allocation
means checking a very large number of core inequalities, we would like to
be able to deduce such allocations directly from the problem data, i.e. not
explicitly considering the game. By relating such ”natural” allocations to other
solution concepts, such as the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)), the nucleolus
(Schmeidler (1969)), and the τ-value (Tijs (1981)), we can learn something
about e.g. the location of the allocation within the core. Another interesting
question is the properties of the allocation method in a dynamic context.
Assuming that there are beneﬁts resulting from cooperation, i.e. the game
has a nonempty core, we would like the allocation methods to be such that it
facilitates the enlargement of the network. When a new bank wants to join
the network, the existing members should not loose by accepting it as a new
member. This is related to the concept of population monotonic allocation
schemes (cf. Sprumont (1990)).
Our paper is similar in spirit to Gow and Thomas (1998), but our approach
diﬀers from theirs in that they do not consider explicitly the location of ATMs
and transactions. Another diﬀerence is that we do not consider ﬁxed costs. In
fact, our cost savings game would not be inﬂuenced by the inclusion of ﬁxed
costs in the manner of Gow and Thomas (1998)1.
In section 2, we introduce the ATM-game. This cost savings game is deﬁned
1This would not be the case, however, if the number and location of ATMs were endoge-
nously determined in our model.
2by aggregating single-location games over the set of locations. In section 3 we
show that the single-location games correspond to information market games,
as deﬁned by Muto et. al. (1989) and Potters and Tijs (1989). This corre-
spondence yields many useful results about these games, and makes us able
to study the more general ATM-games in section 4. We introduce two allo-
cation rules, the equal-split rule and the transaction-based rule.B o t h r u l e s
involve aggregating, over the set of locations, allocations proposed for single-
location games in section 3, and they only diﬀer with respect to locations
where only one bank have ATMs. The equal-split rule yields a core element
that coincides with the τ-value, but is not, in general, a population monotonic
allocation scheme. In the special case where at most one bank have ATMs
in any location, the equal-split rule also coincides with the Shapley value and
the nucleolus, and is population monotonic. The transaction-based rule also
yields a core element, and moreover, is always population monotonic. By using
an example, we illustrate that it is sometimes the only population monotonic
allocation scheme. In the special case where at least two banks have ATMs
in every location, the core consists of a single point, corresponding to the
allocation that results from the transaction-based rule.
2A T M - g a m e s
In this section we will introduce formally our model and deﬁne a ATM cost
savings game. Moreover, we recall some notions from cooperative game theory.
Let N denote the set of banks (players). We deﬁne a location to be a city
or parts thereof, and let L denote the set of locations. Let n￿
i represent the




i denote the number of transactions belonging to S in location
￿.L e t A￿ be the set of banks that have ATMs in location l. Further, let
L1 := {￿ ∈ L : |A￿| =1 } be the set of locations where only one bank is
represented, and let LM := {￿ ∈ L : |A￿ > 1} be the set of locations where
multiple banks are represented. We will assume that L = L1 ∪ LM, i.e. that
there are ATMs in all locations.
With regard to the behaviour of customers, we assume that, if S ⊆ N have
formed a network:
A1 Transactions in a particular location will be processed by an ATM if one
or more members of S have an ATM there.
A2 When a customer of bank i ∈ S performs a transaction in a location ￿,
and if bank i h a sA T M si nl o c a t i o n￿, the customer will use one of the
ATMs of bank i.
3The transaction costs are assumed to be the same for all banks. The transac-
tion cost will be α if the customer uses an ATM of his own bank. If he uses
an ATM of another bank the transaction cost will be β,w h e r eβ>α .T h e
cost of non-ATM transactions is complex, since there exist several alternatives
to using ATMs, such as withdrawing money over the counter, writing a check
to a third person in exchange for cash, or using a cashback facility. In the
four-bank example of Gow and Thomas (1998), the cost of cash withdrawal
over the counter is used as an approximation of this cost. We shall assume
that the cost of a non-ATM transaction is γ,w h e r eγ>β .
Suppose S f o r m san e t w o r k .A s s u m p t i o n sA 1a n dA 2i m p l y ,f o ra n yl o c a t i o n
￿ ∈ L, that the total amount of transaction costs in location ￿ is given by
c￿(S): =
￿
αn￿(S ∩ A￿)+βn￿(S \ A￿)i f S ∩ A￿ ￿= ∅,
γn￿(S) otherwise.
Example 2.1 Consider a location ￿ where the three banks A,B,a n dC,h a v e
customers. The numbers of customers of these banks at ￿ are n￿
A =1 0 0 ,n ￿
B =
150, and n￿
C = 200. Banks A and C have ATMs at ￿. The cost of an ATM
transaction is α = 1 for customers serviced by their own bank, and β =2
otherwise. Every non-ATM transaction involves cost γ = 10. In the previous
terminology we have A￿ = {A,C}. Then these parameters ﬁx the coalitional
cost game c￿. The cost at which the coalition {A} is able to service all its
customers is c￿({A})=αn￿
A =1 0 0 ,s i n c eA ∈ A￿. Similarly, we calculate
c￿({C})=αn￿
C =2 0 0 . S i n c eB ￿∈ A￿,w eh a v ec￿({B})=γn￿
B = 1500.
The cost of serving the customers of A and B together are c￿({A,B})=
αn￿
A +βn￿
B = 100+300 = 400. The customers of A and C are all serviced by
the ATM of their own bank, hence c￿({A,C})=α(n￿
A + n￿
C) = 300. In this
way we compute the cost associated with each coalition, as shown in Figure
2.1. ￿
S {A} {B} {C} {A,B} {A,C} {B,C} N
c￿(S) 100 1500 200 400 300 500 600
Figure 2.1: The values for c￿ in Example .
In order to relate our game to existing literature, it will be convenient to study
the corresponding cost savings game v￿.T h esingle-location ATM-game v￿ is






(γ − β)n￿(S \ A￿)i f S ∩ A￿ ￿= ∅,
0o t h e r w i s e .
(2.1)
Since all the solution concepts that we will study are relatively invariant un-
der strategic equivalence2, all results for a cost savings game can easily be
translated into the setting of a cost game.
Example 2.2 Now we return to Example 2.1. The coalitional cost savings for
that example are speciﬁed in the table below. Notice that the cost savings,
i.e. the values of v￿, arise from transactions of banks that do not have ATMs
in location ￿, i.e. bank B in this case. Notice also the zero values of single
player coalitions. Single players save no costs, regardless of whether they have
ATMs or not. ￿
S {A} {B} {C} {A,B} {A,C} {B,C} N
v￿(S) 0 0 0 1200 0 1200 1200
Figure 2.2: The values for v￿ in Example 2.2.
The ATM-game v is obtained by aggregating over the set of locations, i.e. let,




v￿(S)=( γ − β)
￿
￿∈L:S∩A￿￿=∅
n￿(S \ A￿). (2.2)
Before studying some properties and solutions of single-location ATM-games,
we recall some notions from cooperative game theory. Let (N,g)b es o m ec o s t
savings game. The core is deﬁned as
C(g): ={x ∈ I RN : x(N)=g(N),x (S) ≥ g(S) ∀S ⊂ N}.
In order to deﬁne the Shapley value, Shapley (1953), denoted Φ(g), let Π be
the set of all orderings of the player set. Take a player i ∈ N a n da no r d e r
π ∈ Π. The ith coordinate of the marginal vector mπ(g)i sg i v e nb y
mπ
i (g): =g({π(1),...,π(k − 1),π(k)}) −g({π(1),...,π(k − 1)}),
2A solution concept σ is said to be relatively invariant under strategic equivalence iﬀ,
whenever v is a game with σ(v) ￿= ∅, a>0, and b ∈ I R
N, then σ(a + bv)=a + bσ(v). If c is
a cost game, and v is the corresponding cost savings game, then x ∈ σ(c) ⇔ y ∈ σ(v), where
yi := c({i}) − xi for all i ∈ N.
5where i = π(k) .T h eS h a p l e yv a l u ei sd e ﬁ n e da st h ea v e r a g e ,o v e rt h es e tΠ ,







If g is a convex game, i.e. if
g(S)+g(T) ≤ g(S ∪ T)+g(S ∩ T) ∀S,T ⊆ N,
then we know from Shapley (1971) that C(g)=c o n v {mπ(g):π ∈ Π},a n d
hence that Φ(g) ∈ C(g).
For x ∈ IR N such that x(N)=g(N), and for S ⊆ N, e(S,x): =g(S) − x(S)
is called the excess value of S with respect to x.L e t θ(x)b et h e2 n-tuple
whose components are the excesses e(S,x), S ⊆ N, arranged in nonincreasing
order. The nucleolus, Schmeidler (1969), is the payoﬀ vector x such that
x(N)=g(N) ,a n ds u c ht h a tθ(x) is lexicographically minimal.
For eachi ∈ N,l e tMi(g): =g(N)−g(N\{i})d e n o t et h eith coordinate of the
utopia vector M(g). Also, let mi(g): =m a x S￿i{g(S)−
￿
j∈S\{i}Mj(g)} denote
the ith coordinate of the minimum rights vector m(g). If g has a nonempty
core, then the τ-value τ(g), Tijs (1981), is given by the convex combination
of M(g)a n dm(g)t h a ts a t i s ﬁ e s
￿
i∈N τi(g)=g(N).
3 Properties and Solutions of Single-Location Games
In this section we consider single-location games as deﬁned in (2.1). First, we
show that these games are information market games. Second, we consider
some allocations for these games. Here, we distinguish between the cases that
there is only one bank in the location and that there are more than one bank
in the location.
A single-location game can be related to the class of information market games,
see Muto et. al. (1989) and Potters et. al. (1989). An information market
game consists of a set of players N, where a subset I ⊂ N possesses information
about a (patented) new technology, necessary for producing a new product.
The total market for this new product can be partitioned into sub-markets, and
the proﬁt realized by a coalition depends on which sub-markets the coalition
has access to. Let MT denote the set of sub-markets that the coalition T has
access to, and let rT denote the proﬁt that can be realized from these sub-
markets. A coalition S can realize the proﬁt rT i fi th a sa tl e a s to n em e m b e r
with access to the sub-markets MT,i . e . S ∩ T ￿= ∅,a sw e l la sa tl e a s to n e
member with knowledge of the patented technology, i.e. S ∩I ￿= ∅. Therefore,
6the total proﬁt that can be realized by the members of S is given by
vI,r(S)=
￿ ￿
T:T∩S￿=∅rT if S ∩ I ￿= ∅
0o t h e r w i s e ,
(3.1)
thus deﬁning the information market game (N,vI,r). Muto et. al. (1989) show
that, if |I| = 1, then the nucleolus, the τ-value, and (in the convex case) the
Shapley value, coincides. Potters and Tijs (1989) show that, if |I|≥2, and
if rT = 0 for all T ⊆ N such that |T| > 1, then the core consists of a single
point.
Theorem 3.1 A single-location ATM-game is an information market games.




i if T = {i}⊂N \ A￿,
0o t h e r w i s e .
￿
3.1 Locations where Only One Bank has ATMs
In this subsection we discuss the single-location game that has only one bank
in the location.
Because of Theorem 3.1, and since |A￿| = 1, this case is covered by Muto et.
al. (1989). Moreover, since rT =0f o ra l lT ⊆ N such that |T|≥2, we get
the following result.
Proposition 3.2 If ￿ ∈ L1, then the game v￿ is convex.
We denote the bank having ATMs in location ￿ by i￿.Fr o mM u t oe t .a l .( 1 9 8 9 )
and Shapley (1971), respectively, follows the following two characterizations
of the core.
Proposition 3.3 If ￿ ∈ L1,t h e n
(i) C(v￿)={x ∈ I RN : x(N)=v￿(N), 0 ≤ xi ≤ (γ − β)n￿
i ∀i ∈ N \{ i￿}}
(ii) C(v￿)=c o n v {mπ(v￿):π ∈ Π}
Proposition 3.3(ii) is useful here, because the vectors of marginal contributions
have a simple structure in our case. For anyπ ∈ Π, let S￿
π := {i ∈ N : π−1(i) <
π−1(i￿)}, i.e. S￿
π is the set of players that precede i￿ in the order π.






0 if i ∈ S￿
π,
(γ − β)n￿(S￿
π) if i = i￿,
(γ − β)n￿
i if i ∈ N \ S￿
π.
(3.2)
Proof. Consider an arbitrary player i ∈ N.I fi ￿= i￿,a n di joins a coalition
S,t h e na na d d i t i o n a lc o s ts a v i n go f( γ − β)n￿
i will be realized, but only if i￿
is already a member of S.I fi = i￿,t h e ni will provide cost savings for all the
players that are already in S. ￿
Example 3.5 Consider a situation where the banks A,B,a n dC have cus-
tomers in the location ￿.L e tn￿
A =2 0 0 ,n ￿
B =5 0 ,a n dn￿
C = 125. Also, as in
Example 2.1, let α =1 ,β =2 ,a n dγ = 10. Only bank A h a sA T M si nt h e
location. The values of the game v￿ are shown in Figure 3.1, and the marginal
vectors are shown in Figure 3.2. From the picture of the core shown in Fig-
ure 3.3 , the coincidence of the extreme points of the core with the marginal
vectors can indeed be veriﬁed. Observe that, although there are six diﬀerent
orderings of the player set, there are only four distinct marginal vectors. Both
the marginal vectors for which bank A c o m e sﬁ r s t( l a s t )c o i n c i d e s ,a si se a s i l y
seen from (3.2).
S {A} {B} {C} {A,B} {A,C} {B,C} N
v￿(S) 0 0 0 400 1000 0 1400






A,B,C 0 400 1000
A,C,B 0 400 1000
B,A,C 400 0 1000
B,C,A 1400 0 0
C,A,B 1000 400 0
C,B,A 1400 0 0
Figure 3.2: Marginal vectors for Example 3.5.
Figure 3.3: The core (solid lines) for Example 3.5.
In a core element, according to Proposition 3.3(i), a bank i that does not have
an ATM itself, i.e. i ￿= i￿, should be rewarded a non-negative amount, but no
more than the cost savings involving its own transactions, i.e. (γ−β)n￿
i.N e x t ,
we consider a special core allocation which is a compromise between the lower
and upper bound presented by Proposition 3.3(i). We allow bank i to keep
half the cost savings arising from its transactions, and award the remaining
half of the cost savings to the bank owning the ATM(s), i.e. i￿. This results














Proposition 3.6 If ￿ ∈ L1,a n dw￿ is given by (3.3), then w￿ =Φ ( v￿)=
9ν(v￿)=τ(v￿).
Proof. Note that, for a player i ￿= i￿, the number of orderings π such that i
comes after i￿,i . e .i ∈ N \ S￿
π,i se x a c t l y
|Π|
2 . The ﬁrst equality then follows
from (3.2), and from the deﬁnition of the Shapley value. The rest of the proof
follows from Muto et. al. (1989). ￿
Example 3.7 In Example 3.5, bank A is providing cost savings to B and
C by letting their customers use its ATM(s). For bank B, these cost savings
amount to 50 · (10 − 2) = 400, of which B is allowed to keep half, i.e. 200.
Bank C’s transactions give rise to cost savings of 125 · 8 = 1000, and he is
allowed to keep 500. The Shapley value, the nucleolus, and the τ-value all
coincide with the point (700,200,500). ￿
3.2 Locations Where Multiple Banks Have ATMs
In this section we discuss the single-location games that has more than one
bank in the location.
In this case we propose an allocation where, when cost savings are realized,
the entire cost savings go to the owner of the transactions involved. Hence,
the owners of the ATMs that provide these cost savings, do not get any part








From Theorem 3.1 and Potters and Tijs (1989) we have the following result.
Proposition 3.8 If ￿ ∈ LM,t h e nC(v￿)={x￿},w h e r ex￿ is given by (3.4).
We also have x￿ = ν(v￿)=τ(v￿).
Example 3.9 Recall the situation described in Example 2.1 and Example
2.2. Bank B is the only one that does not have ATMs, so the only cost savings
are those involving B’s transactions. According to (3.4), B will be allowed to
keep the entire cost savings himself, and this yields the unique core allocation
(0,1200,0). The game v￿ is not convex, since
v￿({A,B}) − v￿({B}) = 1200 >v ￿({A,B,C}) − v￿({B,C})=0 ,
and the Shapley value, given by Φ(v￿)=( 2 0 0 ,800,200), is not a core element.
￿
104 Two Allocation Rules for ATM-games
In this section we discuss the ATM-games. We propose two allocations and
investigate their relation with existing game theoretical solutions.
In this section we turn to the ATM-game v deﬁned by (2.2). In sections 3.1
and 3.2 we proposed allocation rules for single-location ATM-games. In the
following we will discuss two allocation rules for situations with multiple loca-
tions. These rules aggregate, over the set of locations, the allocation vectors
proposed for single locations. We shall relate the resulting solutions to solution
concepts such as the core and the τ-value. Also, we will investigate whether
these allocations rule correspond to population monotonic allocation schemes,
as deﬁned by Sprumont (1990). Let P(N) denote the set of nonempty subsets
of N.
Deﬁnition 4.1 Av e c t o rd =( diS)i∈S,S∈P(N) is a population monotonic
allocation scheme of the game v if and only if
￿
i∈S
diS = v(S) ∀S ∈ P(N), (4.1)
diS ≤ yiT ∀i ∈ S ⊆ T ∈ P(N). (4.2)
Hence, d speciﬁes an allocation for every game corresponding to the population
S ⊆ N, where the characteristic function is given by the restriction of v to the
members of S. (4.1) expresses that the entire cost v(S) should be covered, and
(4.2) that no player shall be made worse oﬀ as new players enter the games. In
the ATM network situation, population monotonicity ensures that members
of an existing network will not object to new banks joining the network.
4.1 The Equal-Split Rule
We ﬁrst propose an allocation rule that splits the cost savings equally between
owners of transactions and the owner of the ATMs. Thus, for ￿ ∈ L1 we choose
w￿ as deﬁned by (3.3), and for ￿ ∈ LM we choose x￿ according to (3.4). This




























11Since the equal-split rule adds core elements of the games v￿, the following
result is obvious.
Theorem 4.2 The equal-split rule gives a core element of the game v.
Example 4.3 Consider a situation with two locations, i.e. L := {1,2},a n d
three banks, i.e. N = {A,B,C}. In location 1 the banks have 100, 150, and
200 transactions, respectively. Here, bank A and C have ATMs. In location 2
the banks have 200, 50, and 125 transactions, respectively, and only bank A
has ATMs there. The locations correspond to those described in Example 2.1
and 3.5, respectively. As before, α =1 ,β =2 ,a n dγ = 10. The values of the
resulting game v a r es h o w ni nFi g u r e4 . 1 ,a n dap i c t u r eo ft h ec o r ei nFi g u r e
4.2 . In location 1, where both bank A and C have ATMs, the equal-split rule
prescribes the allocation (0,1200,0), and in location 2, where only bank A has
ATMs, the allocation (700,200,500). Summing the allocation vectors, we get
y := (700,1400,5 0 0 ) .Fr o mFi g u r e4 . 2i tc a nb es e e nt h a tt h i si sap o i n ti nt h e
relative interior of the core. It coincides with the τ-value, but not with the
Shapley value or the nucleolus, given by the allocation vectors (900,1000,700)
and (950,1150,500), respectively.
S {A} {B} {C} {A,B} {A,C} {B,C} N
v(S) 0 0 0 1600 1000 1200 2600
Figure 4.1: The game v in Example 4.3.
￿
12Figure 4.2: The core (solid lines) for Example 4.3.
In the above example, the allocation returned by the transaction-based rule
c o i n c i d e dw i t ht h eτ-value, and this property holds in the general case.
Theorem 4.4 If y results from the equal-split rule, then y = τ(v).
Proof. Recall the deﬁnition in (4.3), and note that, if ￿ ∈ L1,t h e nw￿ =
1
2(M(v￿)+m(v￿)) follows from the proof of Theorem 4.1 in Muto et. al.
(1989). For ￿ ∈ LM,w ew i l ls h o wt h a tx￿ = M(v￿)=m(v￿), and the desired






Let ￿ ∈ LM. For every i ∈ N we have
Mi(v￿)=v￿(N) − v￿(N \{ i})=
￿
(γ − β)n￿
i if i ∈ N \ A￿,
0i f i ∈ A￿.
If i ∈ N \ A￿,t h e n
































=m a x {(γ − β)n￿
i,0} =( γ − β)n￿
i,



















The equal-split does not always satisfy population monotonicity, as the fol-
lowing example illustrates.
Example 4.5 Consider a situation with two locations, i.e. L := {1,2},
and three banks, i.e. N := {A,B,C}. A h a sA T M si nb o t hl o c a t i o n s ,B in
location 1, and C in neither location. Hence, A1 = {A,B},a n dA2 := {A}.




q if i = C and ￿ =1 ,
p otherwise,
where p<q .L e t γ − β := 1. The cost savings realized by the various
coalitions S ⊆ N, i.e. the values of the game v, are shown in Figure 4.5.
Suppose that B and C have formed a network. The cost savings that they
realize are q, involving only the transactions of C in location 1, where B is




Suppose that A wants to join the network. It will provide cost savings for
both B and C in location 2, where it is the only bank present, and the total










Hence, bank B,s i n c ep<q ,w i l lh a v ei t sp a y o ﬀr e d u c e d ,a n di ti st h e r e f o r e
likely that it will oppose A being accepted as a new participant in the network.
￿
S {A} {B} {C} {A,B} {A,C} {B,C} N
v(S) 0 0 0 p q + p q q +2 p
Figure 4.2: The game v of Example 4.5.
However, there are situations in which even the equal-split rule satisﬁes pop-
ulation monotonicity, as the next example shows.
Example 4.6 Consider Example 4.5 again, but now with the assumption that
p = q, i.e. all the banks have the same number of transactions, in all locations
14￿ ∈ L. We will check that the allocation scheme (yiS)S∈P(N) corresponding to
the equal-split rule is population monotonic. If a bank operate on its own, i.e.
if |S| = 1, no cost savings will be realized, and we have yiS =0f o ra l li ∈ N.
If all the banks participate in the network, the total cost savings will be 3p,











Since the equal-split rule always assigns positive payoﬀs to all banks, we only
need to check, for each S ⊂ N such that |S| =2 ,t h a tyiS ≤ yiN. The equal-








if S = {A,B},
p if S = {A,C},
p
2
if S = {B,C},
hence population monotonicity is satisﬁed. ￿
Finally, we consider a special case where the equal-split rule does satisfy pop-
ulation monotonicity, and several well-known solution concepts coincides.
Theorem 4.7 If L = L1,t h e n
(i) the equal-split rule is a population monotonic allocation scheme, and
(ii) if the allocation y results from the equal-split rule, then y =Φ ( v)=
ν(v)=τ(v).
Proof. (i) Let, for any S ⊆ N, LS
1 := {￿ ∈ L : |A￿ ∩ S| =1 },a n d
LS
M := {￿ ∈ L : |A￿ ∩S|≥2}. The result follows from (4.3), γ>β , n￿
i ≥ 0f o r
all i ∈ N, and by noting that if S ⊆ T,t h e nLS
1 ⊆ LT
1 .
(ii) This result follows from the additivity of the Shapley value, and Muto et.
al. (1989). ￿
4.2 The Transaction-Based Rule
Suppose that banks with ATMs are given no reward for the cost savings that
they provide for the banks without ATMs. The cost savings are rewarded to
the bank owning the transactions for which the savings are realized. Thus, for
every ￿ ∈ L,w ec h o o s ex￿ as deﬁned by (3.4), and then we sum over the set









Since (3.4) yields core elements for each of the games v￿, ￿ ∈ L, the following
result follows easily.
Theorem 4.8 The transaction-based rule gives a core element of v.
Example 4.9 We apply (3.4) to location 1 and 2, respectively, and get the
allocations vectors (0,1200,0) and (0,400,1000). By summing these, we get
the allocation vector z := (0,1600,1000). From Figure 4.2 we see that this
corresponds to one of the extreme points of the core3. ￿
We saw in section 4.1 that the equal-split rule is not necessarily population
monotonic. The transaction-based rule is better in this respect.
Theorem 4.10 The transaction-based rule is a population monotonic alloca-
tion scheme.
Proof. The result follows from (4.4), γ>β , n￿
i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N,a n db y





We showed, in Example 4.6, that there are cases where even the equal-split rule
is population monotonic. Next we provide an example where the transaction-
based rule is the only population monotonic allocation scheme.
Example 4.11 Consider a situation with two locations, i.e. L := {1,2},a n d
three banks, i.e. N := {A,B,C}. A has ATMs in both locations. Bank B has
ATMs only in location 1, and C only in location 2. The cost savings for one
transaction is γ − β := 1, and every bank i ∈ N has n￿
i := p transactions in
location ￿ =1 ,2. The core of the game corresponding to the grand coalition
S {A} {B} {C} {A,B} {A,C} {B,C} N
v(S) 0 0 0 p p 2p 2p
Figure 4.3: The game v of Example 4.11.
3That this is not so in general can be veriﬁed by e.g. adding a location 3 to the example,
where n
3
i = 100 for all i ∈ N,a n dA
3 = {B}.
16consists of the allocation (0,p,p), which is returned by the transaction-based
rule. In the sub-game corresponding to the coalition {A,B}, where the value
p is to be allocated between bank A and B, the transaction-based rule and the





the former allocation is the only one that satisﬁes population monotonicity.
In the sub-game corresponding to the coalition {A,C}, where the value p is





2), respectively, and again the only allocation that satisﬁes pop-
ulation monotonicity is the one returned by the transaction-based rule. In the
sub-game corresponding to the coalition {B,C},w h e r et h ev a l u e2 p is to be
allocated between bank B and C, both rules return the allocation (p,p), which
is the only allocation satisfying population monotonicity. ￿
Finally, we consider the special case where all locations are served by at least
two banks. In this case the core consists of a single point, corresponding to
the allocation returned by the transaction-based rule.
Theorem 4.12 If L = LM,a n dy results from the transaction-based rule,
then C(v)={z}.
Proof. Because of Theorem 4.8, we only need to show that ¯ z ∈ C(v) implies
¯ z = z.Fr o m¯ z ∈ C(v)a n d|A￿| > 1f o ra l l￿ ∈ L follows




i = zi ∀i ∈ N,













¯ zi ≥ v({i}) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N,
hence the desired result. ￿
Remark 4.13 If L = LM, then the equal-split rule and the transaction-based
rule coincides, so if z is given by transaction-based rule, we have z = τ(v).
Also, since Theorem 4.12 implies that the core consists of only one point, this
point must be the nucleolus, and therefore we have z = ν(v).
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